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Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on 
Independence for Scotland
Stephen Tierney*
The 2014 referendum: Towards a consensual process – The Edinburgh Agreement: 
framing the referendum process – Process rules and key issues – After the referendum: 
Scotland’s status under international law – Secession under international law – Mem-
bership of international organisations, especially the European Union
Introduction
On 18 September 2014 a referendum will be held in Scotland. It will pose the 
following question to the people: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country?’ 
If a majority of voters say yes to this proposition Scotland will withdraw from the 
United Kingdom (UK), ending a union formed in 1707 and offering an unclear 
future for one of Europe’s oldest nation states. The significance of this process for 
other European states and for the European Union (EU) project itself is also con-
siderable. Never before has part of an EU member state broken away while simul-
taneously seeking to remain a member of the EU as a new state. Important 
questions arise. The UK is an important member; would its influence within the 
EU diminish with the loss of an important part of its territory and territorial 
waters? Will Scottish independence offer encouragement to other highly mobilised 
sub-state nationalist movements in Belgium and Spain for example, while provid-
ing a precedent for access to international and European institutions for secession-
ist territories? These questions are political in nature and rather than attempt to 
answer them directly, this paper will address the legal context which must condi-
tion how such questions are addressed. 
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We will look first at the domestic constitutional situation in the United King-
dom. It is notable that an intergovernmental agreement has been reached by the 
UK and Scottish Governments setting out a framework for the process rules which 
will govern the referendum. This is itself remarkable. The UK Government has 
entered consensually, if somewhat reluctantly, into a process which could lead to 
the break-up of the state, a level of acquiescence which is itself unprecedented in 
the EU context. We will consider the key elements of the referendum process 
which are being set out in detailed legislation by the Scottish Parliament, assessing 
the prospects for a fair constitutional referendum. Secondly, we will turn to the 
possible implications of a majority yes vote for Scotland and the United Kingdom 
under international law. Would Scottish independence be characterised by the 
international community as a case of secession or as bringing about the dissolution 
of the UK? What challenges would Scotland face in seeking recognition as a new 
state and in succeeding to the UK’s international obligations? And, most cru-
cially, how would an independent Scotland come to take up membership of in-
ternational institutions, in particular the United Nations and the EU? 
The 2014 referendum: Towards a consensual process 
Constitutional background
The referendum has been a central feature of recent Scottish constitutional his-
tory. An attempt to introduce devolution in 1979 failed following a referendum 
in which the threshold for support was not met.1 This failure led to an extra-
parliamentary campaign for devolution through the 1980s and 1990s. This cul-
minated in another referendum in 1997 in which the people of Scotland voted 
for the establishment of a Scottish Parliament with some limited tax-varying pow-
ers. The consequent Scotland Act 1998 set out the powers not only of the parlia-
ment, which was formally inaugurated on 1 July 1999, but also of the executive 
branch of the devolution settlement, the Scottish Executive. The Scottish Execu-
tive was renamed the Scottish Government by the Scotland Act 2012, which gives 
further powers to the Scottish Parliament and clarifies various other aspects of the 
relationship between the devolved Scottish institutions and the central UK insti-
tutions.
It is against this institutional context that the Scottish National Party (SNP) 
achieved an electoral breakthrough in 2007. It was elected as the largest party 
within the Scottish Parliament but, without an overall majority of seats, it oper-
ated as a minority government from 2007 to 2011. A referendum was proposed 
1 51.6% voted yes, but on a turnout of 63.8% this fell short of the required 40% of registered 
voters needed for the Scotland Act 1978 to be implemented. 
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in a White Paper, Your Scotland, Your Voice: A National Conversation in 2009,2 
which also established a ‘national conversation’, seeking to engage the public and 
civil society in debating Scotland’s constitutional future. But the proposal went 
no further than this. Without majority support in the Scottish Parliament, in the 
end no referendum bill was introduced.
The SNP was however able to form a new government in 2011, this time with 
an overall parliamentary majority. The party had fought the Scottish general elec-
tion that year with a manifesto commitment to hold a referendum on indepen-
dence3 and in January 2012 the Scottish Government announced its intention to 
do so in the autumn of 2014. A consultation paper (Your Scotland, Your Referen-
dum) was published, setting out detailed proposals for how this referendum would 
be organised and regulated. A draft Referendum Bill to this effect was published 
which asserted the authority of the Scottish Parliament to hold a referendum, 
while a public consultation exercise was embarked upon.4 The United Kingdom 
Government immediately challenged the legislative competence of the Scottish 
Parliament to pass this bill, and in doing so launched its own consultation process.5 
The first half of 2012 was consumed by debate about the powers of the Scottish 
Parliament to authorise a referendum under the Scotland Act 1998. Commenta-
tors differed sharply on this point,6 and for a time it appeared as if the issue might 
find its way to the United Kingdom Supreme Court for adjudication. The Scottish 
Government was itself guarded about the nature of the Scottish Parliament’s pow-
ers, going no further than to suggest that the Scottish Parliament had power to 
hold a consultative rather than a binding referendum, since the union between 
Scotland and England was a reserved matter under the Scotland Act 1998.7 
2 <www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2009/11/26155932/0>, visited 23 July 2013.
3 ‘Re-Elect: A Scottish Government Working for Scotland’, SNP Manifesto, 2011 <http://
votesnp.com/campaigns/SNP_Manifesto_2011_lowRes.pdf>, visited 23 July 2013. 
4 ‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum: A Consultation Document’, Scottish Government, 25 Jan. 
2012, <www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2012/01/1006>, visited 23 July 2013.
5 ‘Facilitating a Legal, Fair and Decisive Referendum in Scotland’, Scotland Office, Office of the 
Advocate-General for Scotland and Cabinet Office of the UK Government, 19 Feb. 2013 <www.
gov.uk/government/policies/facilitating-a-legal-fair-and-decisive-referendum-in-scotland>, visited 
23 July 2013. 
6 Contrast: Adam Tomkins, ‘The Scottish Parliament and the Independence Referendum’, UK 
Constitutional Law Group blog, 12 Jan. 2012, <http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/01/12/adam-
tomkins-the-scottish-parliament-and-the-independence-referendum/>, visited 23 July 2013, with 
Gavin Anderson et al.: ‘The Independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested Constitution: 
Widening the Debate’, UK Constitutional Law Group blog, 31 Jan. 2012, <http://ukconstitutional-
law.org/2012/01/31/gavin-anderson-et-al-the-independence-referendum-legality-and-the-contest-
ed-constitution-widening-the-debate/>, visited 23 July 2013. 
7 In ‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum’, supra n. 4, paras. 1.5-1.9, the Scottish Government stat-
ed its preference for a short, direct question about independence, and took the view that there were 
suitable questions which would be within the legislative competence of the Scottish parliament.
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It did however acknowledge the UK Government’s publicly stated view that leg-
islation for any form of referendum on independence would be outwith the exist-
ing powers of the Scottish Parliament.8 
The Edinburgh Agreement: Framing the referendum process
In the end the two governments reached a settlement on 15 October 2012 when 
an agreement (‘The Edinburgh Agreement’9) was signed. The governments agreed 
that the referendum should:
– have a clear legal base;
– be legislated for by the Scottish Parliament;
– be conducted so as to command the confidence of parliaments, governments 
and people;
– deliver a fair test and a decisive expression of the views of people in Scotland 
and a result that everyone will respect.
The agreement and its associated ‘memorandum of agreement’ also confirmed that 
the referendum legislation to be passed by the Scottish Parliament should set the 
date of the referendum; the franchise; the wording of the question; rules on cam-
paign financing; and miscellaneous other rules for the conduct of the referendum.
The agreement has been consolidated by formal legal authority from the UK 
executive and parliament. A draft Order in Council (a form of secondary legisla-
tion made by the UK Government and authorised by Section 30 of the Scotland 
Act 1998) was attached to the agreement.10 This Section 30 Order devolves to the 
Scottish Parliament the competence to legislate for a referendum which must be 
held before the end of 2014.11 It is of considerable significance not only that the 
UK Government has accepted the fundamental principle that the Scottish people 
have the right, by way of referendum, to determine whether or not they will remain 
within the United Kingdom, but that both governments have been able to reach 
agreement as to the referendum process, accepting that the detailed process rules 
should be set by the devolved institutions in Scotland. This contrasts sharply with 
 8 ‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum’, supra n. 4, para. 1.7.
 9 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a 
referendum on independence for Scotland, 15 Oct. 2012, <www.scotland.gov.uk/About/Govern-
ment/concordats/Referendum-on-independence>, visited 23 July 2013. 
10 This has now been passed by the UK Parliament: the Scotland Act 1998 (Modification of 
Schedule 5) Order 2013 (S.I. 2013/242) (hereafter, ‘the Section 30 Order’).
11 The Section 30 Order, para. 3.
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so many states where the issue of secessionist or sovereignist referendums has been 
the source of such deep and protracted disagreement.12 
Already the procedural rules for the referendum have been taking shape, with 
one bill now enacted and the other before the Scottish Parliament. The franchise 
rules for the referendum are set out in the Scottish Independence Referendum 
(Franchise) Act (‘the Franchise Act’), introduced into the Scottish Parliament on 
11 March, and enacted on 7 August. This bill required to pass through the Scottish 
Parliament quickly to facilitate the registration of voters, particularly new voters 
since the franchise for the referendum is extended to 16 and 17 year olds. The 
Scottish Independence Referendum Bill was introduced into the parliament on 
21 March 2013 and is expected to be passed in November.13
Process rules – key issues
We will now address some of the key process issues.
Franchise
Both governments agreed in the Edinburgh Agreement that it was for the Scottish 
Government to propose – and the Scottish Parliament to determine – what the 
franchise for a referendum on Scottish independence should be. The Referendum 
Bill provides that details of who can vote in the referendum are as contained in 
the Franchise Act.14 The general franchise demarcation in the latter Act is uncon-
troversial. The franchise for the referendum is the same as for Scottish Parliament 
elections and local government elections,15 mirroring the franchise used in the 
Scottish devolution referendum in 1997. One consequence is that EU and Com-
monwealth citizens who are resident in Scotland will be able to vote in the inde-
12 Two very pertinent comparators are: Canada, in respect of which see the battle for control of 
the referendum process in Quebec: Bill C-20, 2nd sess, 36th parliament, 48 Elizabeth II, 1999 (as 
passed by the House of Commons 15 March 2000) (Clarity Act 2000) s 1(1) on the one hand, and 
An Act respecting the exercise of the fundamental rights and prerogatives of the Québec people and 
the Québec state, Quebec National Assembly, 1st sess, 36th leg Bill 99 (assented to 13 Dec. 2000) 
s 3, on the other; and Spain: see Elisenda Casanas Adam, ‘Another Independence Referendum 
in 2014? Recent Developments in Catalonia’, Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum blog, <www.
scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/tabid/1767/articleType/Ar 
ticleView/articleId/1031/Elisenda-Casenas-Adams-Another-Independence-Referendum-in-2014-
Recent-Developments-in-Catalonia.aspx>, visited 23 July 2013. See also Stephen Tierney, Constitu-
tional Law and National Pluralism (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004), chapter 8.
13 Scottish Parliament Bill 25 [as introduced] Session 4 (2013). (The bill is hereafter cited as 
‘Referendum Bill’.)
14 Referendum Bill, section 2.
15 Franchise Act, section 2.
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pendence referendum. This is a notable privilege; for example, EU citizens 
domiciled in the Netherlands at the time of the referendum on the draft Consti-
tutional Treaty were not accorded such a right. 
One major difference from the 1997 franchise, however, is the provision in the 
Franchise Bill extending the vote to those aged 16 and 17.16 This is a radical de-
parture; never before have people under the age of 18 been entitled to vote in a 
major British election or referendum.17 Another notable provision of the Franchise 
Act excludes convicted persons from voting for the period during which they are 
detained in a penal institution.18 This exclusion will apply even if the current ban 
on prisoners voting is modified in relation to elections prior to the date of the 
referendum. This has been a controversial topic in the United Kingdom ever since 
the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the blanket ban on prisoner 
voting in UK elections violated Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights.19 It would seem, however, that section 3 of the Franchise 
Bill does not violate the Convention since A3P1 guarantees ‘the free expression of 
the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature’ (emphasis added), which 
is generally taken to refer exclusively to parliamentary elections and to exclude 
referendums.20
The referendum question
The UK Government has taken great interest in the referendum question itself 
and agreement on the parameters of the question was central to the former agree-
ing to the Section 30 Order. The Scottish Government in the course of 2012 
mooted the possibility of a multi-option referendum, offering voters three options: 
independence, the status quo, and possibly a third option of enhanced devolution, 
or ‘devo-max’ as it came to be known. The UK Government was adamant that the 
referendum should be held on the issue of independence only. The Section 30 
Order provides that the referendum is to be concerned with ‘the independence of 
Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom’ and that there can be only ‘one 
16 Franchise Act, section 2(1)(a).
17 The age of 18 as the threshold for UK elections is set out in the Representation of the People 
Act 1983, section 1(d). 
18 Franchise Bill, section 3.
19 Hirst v. the United Kingdom (No. 2) [2005] ECHR 681.
20 Stephen Tierney, ‘Possible Vires Issue in Relation to Section 3 of the Scottish Independence 
Referendum (Franchise) Bill’, Advisory Paper submitted to the Scottish Parliament Referendum 
Bill Committee, 18 March 2013, <www.scottish.parliament.uk/S4_ReferendumScotlandBillCom-
mittee/20130321_Letter_to_DFM_on_prisoners_voting_rights.pdf>, visited 23 July 2013. The 
exclusion does seem likely to be challenged in the Scottish courts: Severin Carrell, ‘Scottish Prison-
ers Challenge Ban on Voting in Independence Referendum’, The Guardian, 28 June 2013. 
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ballot paper at the referendum […] giv[ing] the voter a choice between only two 
responses.’21 
The draft question set by the Scottish Government in ‘Your Scotland, Your 
Referendum’ has also been subject to, and altered in consequence of, independent 
oversight. The regime for independent assessment of referendum questions in the 
UK is set out in the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 (PPERA), 
a UK wide statute covering electoral practice. Where a bill is introduced into the 
UK Parliament which provides for the holding of a referendum, and this bill 
specifies the wording of the referendum question, the Commission ‘shall con-
sider the wording of the referendum question, and shall publish a statement of 
any views of the Commission as to the intelligibility of that question.’22 Notably, 
the Electoral Commission goes about its task of assessing intelligibility by conven-
ing focus groups etc. to test the question empirically, assessing how well it is un-
derstood by voters.23
Initially, however, the regulatory regime in relation to the Scottish independence 
referendum was not clear since PPERA does not apply to referendums organised 
by the Scottish Parliament. This meant that the Electoral Commission had no 
legally guaranteed role in relation to the 2014 referendum. Despite this, following 
conclusion of the Edinburgh Agreement, the Scottish Government decided to 
send its proposed question for review to the Electoral Commission. The proposed 
question at this stage was: ‘Do you agree that Scotland should be an independent 
country?’ The Commission in its subsequent report took issue with the phrase ‘do 
you agree’, suggesting it could lead people to vote yes. It therefore suggested a 
change to the question.24 This has been accepted by the Scottish Government and 
the new question is now contained in the Referendum Bill. The question is: ‘Should 
Scotland be an independent country? Yes/No.’25
Information to, and participation by, citizens
The Referendum Bill also formalises a more general oversight role for the Elec-
toral Commission. Among a number of statutory duties the Commission is given 
21 Section 30 Order, para. 3.
22 PPERA, section 104(2).
23 E.g., Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on the UK Parliamentary Voting System: Report 
of Views of the Electoral Commission on the Proposed Referendum Question’, 2010 <www.elec-
toralcommission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/102696/PVSC-Bill-QA-Report.pdf>, visited 
23 July, 2013; Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the 
Electoral Commission on the Proposed Referendum Question’, 30 Jan. 2013 <www.electoralcom-
mission.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/153691/Referendum-on-independence-for-Scotland-
our-advice-on-referendum-question.pdf>, visited 23 July, 2013.
24 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland: Advice of the Electoral 
Commission on the proposed referendum question’, supra n. 23. 
25 Referendum Bill, section 1.
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the task of promoting public awareness and understanding in Scotland about the 
referendum, the referendum question, and voting in the referendum.26 This is 
likely to be a challenging role, particularly in explaining the referendum question. 
In March 2013, John McCormick (Electoral Commissioner for Scotland) and 
Andy O’Neill (Head of Office Scotland for the Electoral Commission) provided 
evidence to the Referendum Bill Committee in the Scottish Parliament in relation 
to this draft provision and fielded questions from committee members on how 
best to register and inform voters, particularly the new category of young voters; 
how best to mobilise an information campaign, using new techniques through 
social media etc.; and how best to overcome apathy among minority groups.27 The 
most difficult task for the commission would seem to be in promoting understand-
ing of the question. There is already a heated debate between the UK and Scottish 
Governments as to what ‘independence’ will mean for Scotland, one issue being 
how easily Scotland would access membership of international organisations (see 
infra, ‘After the referendum’). It is hard to see how the Electoral Commission could 
attempt to produce an objective account of a number of highly technical and 
fiercely contested issues, concerning not only international relations but also de-
fence, economic relations, the question of a currency union, the disentanglement 
of the welfare state, national debt etc., particularly when so many features of the 
post-referendum landscape would be contingent upon negotiations between the 
two governments in the event of a majority yes vote. In further evidence to the 
Committee in May Mr McCormick said that the commission would ‘not seek to 
explain to voters what independence means’ but would offer information ‘aimed 
at ensuring that all eligible electors are registered and know how to cast their vote.’28
Referendum period/moratorium
The Referendum Bill sets a regulatory period of 16 weeks before the referendum 
within which the statutory regime of campaign regulation will take effect, setting 
limits on campaign expenditure.29 Since the referendum will still be one year away 
by the time the Referendum Bill is passed, this leaves a lengthy period within 
which the referendum campaigns will not be subject to this detailed model of 
regulation. Another set of regulations introduce what is known as a ‘purdah’ pe-
riod. This is common in UK elections. Under PPERA there is to be no promo-
tional activity by government, local authorities or public bodies during the 28 day 
26 Referendum Bill, section 21.
27 Scottish Parliament Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee, 21 March 2013, Official 
Report, col. 263-281
28 Scottish Parliament Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee, 23 May 2013, Official Report, 
col. 431.
29 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, Part 3.
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‘relevant period’ prior to an election poll. This period will run in parallel with the 
last four weeks of the regulatory period. This provision is largely replicated in 
relation to the Scottish Government and a wide range of other public bodies which 
must not engage in promotional activity in the four weeks prior to the referen-
dum.30 The UK Government also committed to be bound by equivalent restrictions 
in the Edinburgh Agreement.31
Funding and spending rules
Funding
Efforts are made within the Referendum Bill to ensure equality of arms between 
the two campaign groups. Each side in the campaign can apply to the Electoral 
Commission to be appointed as one of two ‘designated organisations’, and both 
the Yes Scotland and Better Together campaign groups have intimated their respec-
tive intention to do so. One notable feature of the Referendum Bill is that there 
is to be no public funding for the two designated organisations. This is a conscious 
departure from PPERA which does offer public funding for referendums. The 
decision not to fund the 2014 referendum was a political one taken by the Scottish 
Government. It has not resulted in any significant disagreement, presumably be-
cause both campaigns expect to be amply funded by private donors.
The Edinburgh Agreement also covers funding and expenditure issues.32 Build-
ing on this, the Referendum Bill contains detailed provisions on a range of fund-
ing issues. A ‘Campaign Rules’ provision creates a regulatory regime through which 
funding, spending and reporting will be administered.33 This is generally in line 
with standard PPERA rules. A ‘Control of Donations’ provision34 indicates what 
types of donation are allowed and what constitutes a ‘permissible donor’.35 Under 
these provisions an application must be made for this status. There are also report-
ing requirements which mean that reports on donations received will require to 
be prepared every four weeks.36 These rules will again be overseen by the Elec-
toral Commission.
30 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 25.
31 For comment on this by Deputy First Minister Nicola Sturgeon, see Scottish Parliament Ref-
erendum (Scotland) Bill Committee, 13 June 2013, Official Report, cols. 554 and 560.
32 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a 
referendum on independence for Scotland, supra n. 9, paras. 24-29.
33 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4.
34 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, Part 5.
35 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 1(2).
36 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 41.
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Spending limits 
Within the Referendum Bill there are four categories of actors entitled to spend 
money during the campaign period: designated organisations (which can each 
spend up to GBP 1,500,000);37 political parties as ‘permitted participants’;38 
other ‘permitted participants’ who may spend up to GBP 150,000;39 and other 
participants spending less than GBP 10,000, which means they do not require to 
register as permitted participants. 
Political parties as ‘permitted participants’ have a spending limit of either GBP 
3,000,000 multiplied by their percentage share of the vote in the Scottish Parlia-
ment election of 2011, or a minimum of GBP 150,000. By the formula for po-
litical parties the distribution between political parties represented in the Scottish 
Parliament is as follows:
Scottish National Party: GBP 1,344,000
Scottish Labour Party: GBP 834,000
Scottish Conservative & Unionist Party: GBP 396,000
Scottish Liberal Democrats: GBP 201,000
Scottish Green Party: GBP 150,000
The Referendum Bill also defines ‘campaign expenses’. These include campaign 
broadcasts, advertising, material addressed to voters, market research or canvassing, 
press conferences or media relations, transport, rallies, public meetings or other 
events. This also extends to notional expenses such as use of/sum of property, 
services or facilities etc.40 There are also detailed rules on reporting of expenditure.41 
It seems that these rules will lead to a generally level playing field in terms of 
expenditure within the regulatory period. For example, the total spending limit 
for the two pro-independence parties (SNP and Greens) is almost equal to that 
for the three unionist parties – Labour, Conservative and Liberal Democrat. But 
given that these spending limits only apply in the 16 weeks before the referendum, 
arguably this leaves the possibility that one side could heavily out-spend the oth-
er before this period begins.42 It should be observed, however, that these rules 
37 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 18(1).
38 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 18(1).
39 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, para. 17.
40 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, paras. 9 and 10.
41 Referendum Bill, section 10 and Schedule 4, paras. 20-24. The Electoral Commission has a 
power to issue guidance on the different kinds of expenses that qualify as campaign expenses: sec-
tion 10 and Schedule 4, para. 10.
42 Both campaign leaders in evidence to the Committee also recognised that the GBP 150.000 
limit for permitted participants presented an opportunity for individuals to spend large sums of 
money. See, Blair McDougall, Campaign Director, ‘Better Together’, evidence to Scottish Parlia-
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reflect the spending limit recommended by the independent Electoral Commis-
sion.43
Finally, the Referendum Bill provides for civil sanctions44 and criminal of-
fences45 in relation to various categories of electoral malpractice and the Electoral 
Commission is given an important role in enforcing the former. 
After the referendum: International law issues
In light of the Edinburgh Agreement the UK Government is committed to respect-
ing the result of the referendum and, if there is a majority Yes vote, it seems certain 
that it will engage in negotiations towards independence. But as the Electoral 
Commission has suggested, there would still be a range of issues to be resolved 
between Scotland and the UK concerning the terms of independence46 which 
could mean that these negotiations will by no means be straightforward. The 
Electoral Commission recommends that the UK and Scottish Governments ‘should 
clarify what process will follow the referendum in sufficient detail to inform peo-
ple what will happen if most voters vote “Yes” and what will happen if most vot-
ers vote “No”.’47 They go so far as to recommend that both governments ‘should 
agree a joint position, if possible, so that voters have access to agreed information 
about what would follow the referendum. The alternative – two different explana-
tions – could cause confusion for voters rather than make things clearer.’48
The Scottish Government intends to publish a White Paper in the autumn of 
2013 elaborating in detail its independence proposal. Already we have clues to 
suggest that the Scottish Government aspires towards maintaining some aspects 
of union with the UK, including possibly some shared institutions. For example, 
Alex Salmond, the First Minister of Scotland, in a speech in January 2012 said: 
‘when you consider our shared economic interests, our cultural ties, our many 
friendships and family relationships, one thing becomes clear. After Scotland be-
comes independent, we will share more than a monarchy and a currency. We will 
share a social union.’49
ment Referendum (Scotland) Bill Committee, 30 May 2013, Official Report, cols. 472 and 477; 
Blair Jenkins, Campaign Director, ‘Yes Scotland’, evidence to Scottish Parliament Referendum 
(Scotland) Bill Committee, 30 May 2013, Official Report, col. 477.
43 Electoral Commission, ‘Electoral Commission advice on spending limits for the referendum 
on independence for Scotland’, 30 January 2013.
44 Referendum Bill, Schedule 6.
45 Referendum Bill, Schedule 7.
46 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland’, supra n. 23, para. 5.41.
47 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland’, supra n. 23, para. 5.42.
48 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland’, supra n. 23, para. 5.43.
49 Alex Salmond, ‘An Independent Scotland Will Be a Beacon of Fairness’, The Guardian, 23 
Jan. 2013. See also ‘Your Scotland, Your Referendum’, supra n. 4, Foreword by Alex Salmond.
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It is impossible at this time to predict how post-referendum negotiations between 
the two governments would go and what if any elements of union would survive 
Scottish independence.50 In the remainder of this article, therefore, we will instead 
try to cast light on the position of an independent Scotland under international 
law.
Scotland’s status under international law
An independent Scotland would be a new state in international law. How then 
would it take its place within the international community, making the transition 
to membership of international organisations, in particular the European Union? 
This is a major question in the political campaign leading up to the 2014 referen-
dum. But it is a question that is difficult to evaluate for two reasons. The first is 
the political heat which it has generated. It is obviously very important for the 
Scottish Government and the Yes Scotland campaign to emphasise the ease with 
which Scotland would move to statehood, succeed to the UK’s international trea-
ty rights and obligations, and accede to membership of international organisations. 
Conversely, it is in the interests of the UK Government and the Better Together 
campaign to make voters focus upon the challenges of separation, one of which 
they contend is the difficult, time-consuming and potentially costly pathway to 
international institutions within which Scotland may lose some of the advantages, 
such as opt outs from aspects of the EU treaties which it currently enjoys as part 
of the United Kingdom. Secondly, some of the issues involved are currently inde-
terminable. This is particularly the case in relation to the European Union. The 
debate about international institutions has tended to focus on membership of the 
EU given the political and economic salience of Europe for Scotland; but it is also 
the case that the issues are particularly complex in this regard since the situation 
of a territory leaving an existing EU member state while seeking to retain member-
ship of the EU is itself unprecedented.
We will address the following issues in order: 
– how to characterise Scotland’s move to statehood: dissolution, secession or 
negotiated independence;
– secession under international law;
– recognition;
– succession;
– membership of international institutions;
50 See generally Tom Mullen and Stephen Tierney, ‘Scotland’s Constitutional Future: The Legal 
Issues’ (5 June 2012), Edinburgh School of Law Research Paper No. 2013/16, <http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2235348> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2235348>, visited 23 July 2013.
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– the special case of the EU.
Emergence of Scotland as a new state
In the first place, how should the emergence of Scotland as a new state be charac-
terised under international law, and how is it likely to be characterised by the 
international community? Specifically, would the withdrawal of Scotland from 
the United Kingdom be treated as a case of secession, or would the United King-
dom be considered to have dissolved? Secession is a process whereby part of the 
territory of an existing state and its people separate from that state, leading to the 
creation of a new state.51 In a case of state dissolution the United Kingdom would 
cease to exist as a legal person and two, or more, entirely new entities would emerge. 
Put another way, will the remaining United Kingdom be treated as a continuing 
state, or would there be a situation of state succession for the UK as well as for 
Scotland? 
The latter situation (state dissolution) seems very unlikely. A precedent for state 
dissolution is the collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). 
Here the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) claimed to 
be the legal and political continuation of SFRY. The Badinter Commission, 
established to assess legal issues arising out of the Yugoslav crisis, in its first 
Opinion took the view that the state was ‘in the process of dissolution’, a deci-
sion which then led to the various other Opinions on recognition of the former 
republics etc.52 The division of Czechoslovakia was also treated as dissolution 
of the state. The two emerging states – the Czech Republic and Slovakia – 
reached agreement to the effect that Czechoslovakia would cease to exist and 
that neither would claim to be the continuing state.53 
With so few precedents, no general treaty rule applicable to all situations, and 
the intensely political nature of state collapse/secession, there is no hard and 
fast line demarcating the point at which loss of territory results in dissolution 
rather than secession, but the general predisposition of international law is to 
favour state continuation where possible. Indeed, the fact that the Czech Re-
51 See, for example, the characterisation of secession by the Supreme Court of Canada when 
addressing the analogous case of Quebec, as ‘the effort of a group or section of a State to withdraw 
itself from the political and constitutional authority of that State, with a view to achieving state-
hood for a new territorial unit on the international plane’, Supreme Court of Canada, Reference re 
Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, para. 83.
52 Badinter, Opinion No. 1, 31 ILM (1992), 1494. See Allain Pellet, ‘The Opinions of the 
Badinter Arbitration Committee: A Second Breath for the Self-Determination of Peoples’, 3 Euro-
pean Journal of International Law (1992) p. 178-185. 
53 Anthony Aust, Handbook of International Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2010) p. 370-371.
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public and Slovakia believed it necessary to say, expressly, that there would be no 
continuation of the old Czechoslovakia and, instead, that they were forming two 
successor states suggests that continuity is otherwise the default position.54 James 
Crawford has observed that ‘a state is not necessarily extinguished by substantial 
changes in territory, population, or government, or even, in some cases, by a 
combination of all three.’55 The loss by Pakistan of over half its population in the 
secession of Bangladesh did not result in dissolution. Also, despite the loss of the 
significant territory of South Sudan (its population level was disputed but consti-
tuted between 22-30% of the Republic of Sudan before the south gained its in-
dependence), the Republic of Sudan continues its international personality. 
Certainly Scotland constitutes a significant area (almost one third) of the United 
Kingdom’s land mass, but it contains less than 10% of the population. The ter-
ritories of England, Wales and Northern Ireland would all still be contained with-
in the United Kingdom and the UK would retain ‘its principal governmental 
institutions.’56 These factors suggest a strong presumption in favour of the UK’s 
continuation. 
The question of dissolution/secession has been considered by James Crawford 
in the opinion cited above and written jointly with Alan Boyle. This was commis-
sioned by the United Kingdom government and addresses the international legal 
aspects arising from Scottish independence. As noted, it was published as an annex 
to a broader report by the UK Government itself. The report is a political docu-
ment which seeks to emphasise that an independent Scotland would face consid-
erable difficulties, not least in seeking membership of international organisations. 
An important caveat then is that this paper has a political purpose and seeks to 
influence the referendum debate. That said, the annexed Opinion offered by the 
highly respected Professors Crawford and Boyle should be taken on its own mer-
its. Crawford and Boyle consider not only the separation versus dissolution sce-
nario but also a third possibility, reversion, whereby Scotland would somehow 
revert to its pre-1707 status as an independent state. They consider it very un-
likely that Scottish independence would be widely understood in this way, and in 
any case such a conceptualization would have limited relevance since the vast 
majority of international obligations to which Scotland would wish to succeed, 
including membership of international institutions, have been entered into by the 
United Kingdom much more recently. 
54 I am grateful to Tom Grant for this observation.
55 James Crawford, Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2006) p. 417.
56 James Crawford and Alan Boyle, ‘Referendum on the Independence of Scotland – Interna-
tional Law Aspects’, Opinion published in annex to the UK Government’s ‘Report on “Devolution 
and the Implications of Scottish Independence”’, UK Government, Cm 8554, Feb. 2013, para. 69. 
(The Opinion is hereafter cited as ‘Crawford and Boyle’.)
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Crawford and Boyle distinguish the Scottish/UK situation from the SFRY 
and Czechoslovakia cases, arguing that it is highly unlikely either that the 
United Kingdom would agree to a Czech-Slovak scenario upon the departure 
of Scotland or that the UK’s claim to be the continuing UK state would be 
seriously contested. The most obvious analogy to the independence of Scotland 
it seems is the withdrawal of the Irish Free State from the United Kingdom which 
did not affect the continuation of the United Kingdom as a state.57 
Any risk that the independence of Scotland could be seen as bringing about a 
dissolution of the state could also be greatly reduced by an agreement between 
Scotland and the UK. This is clearly feasible. In the Edinburgh Agreement we see 
a consensual approach to the referendum process. If this level of pragmatism were 
to continue into negotiations towards independence then an explicit declaration 
that both parties consider the UK to be a continuing state could possibly be se-
cured. Indeed, it seems likely that a fundamental condition for such negotiations 
on the part of the UK Government would be the Scottish Government’s recogni-
tion of the UK’s continuation as the UK state, and it is hard to see how it would 
be in the interests of the Scottish Government to press the dissolution argument. 
This situation is not without precedent. The continuation of Russia as the USSR 
state was aided by agreement of the other members of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.58 It is not sufficient to say that the SFRY was deemed to have 
dissolved merely because of the lack of any such agreement, but it is notable that 
consensus among the republics was lacking in this case.59
In the end, the response by other states and international organisations to the 
independence of Scotland from the UK will be heavily influenced by political 
considerations. It would seem that the political significance of the UK as a mem-
ber of the EU, NATO and the Security Council of the United Nations would all 
be important factors in encouraging others to view it as the continuing state. The 
fact that Russia could continue as a permanent member of the Security Council, 
avoiding the need to revisit how membership of that body is constituted, was 
without doubt a significant factor in the international community treating Russia 
as the USSR’s continuation. Similar considerations may well attend the status of 
the UK were Scottish independence to come about.60 The examples of Sudan 
already mentioned and of Ethiopia continuing after the loss of Eritrea also bolster 
this argument. It is, therefore, highly likely that Scottish withdrawal from the 
United Kingdom would be treated by the international community as a case 
57 Matthew Happold, ‘Independence: In Or out of Europe? An Independent Scotland and the 
European Union’, 49 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2000) p. 15 at p. 19-20; Craw-
ford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para.68.
58 On Russia see Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 57. 
59 Badinter, supra n. 52.
60 See also Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, paras. 69-70; para. 131.
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of secession from the continuing state of the United Kingdom, although, as we 
will see, Crawford and Boyle’s characterization of this as ‘negotiated indepen-
dence’61 may well have a significant bearing in how Scotland would be treated 
by the international community, distinguishing the Scottish case significantly 
from the more typical problem under international law of ‘unilateral secession’. 
Secession under international law
If there is no attempt by the United Kingdom to oppose independence this should 
in turn avoid the need for any serious debate about the legality of the act of seces-
sion under international law which focuses upon secession as a unilateral act in-
variably opposed by the host state. Nonetheless, following a yes vote in the 
referendum, in the event that no agreement results from negotiations between 
the two governments as to Scotland’s independence from the United Kingdom 
(and while this may seem unlikely at present, we ought not to discount the 
possibility), it is relevant to consider the international law position on unilat-
eral secession. 
The International Court of Justice in 2010 offered an advisory opinion on the 
Kosovo declaration of independence. The majority on the Court took the view 
that international law contains no ‘prohibition on declarations of independence’ 
from a host state, but nor does it expressly authorise such declarations.62 Notably, 
the Advisory Opinion of the Court is limited to dealing with the declaration of 
independence rather than with the lawfulness of secession itself.63 But arguments 
before the Court submitted by other states are illuminating. While most states 
which offered a view did not consider international law to contain a right to secede, 
some argued that in limited circumstances such a right does exist. For example, 
the Netherlands argued that secession was justified in the Kosovo case because of 
the systematic violation of civil and human rights of Kosovans over a long period;64 
a position which echoes the ‘remedial right’ of secession articulated in normative 
terms by political theorists.65 This argument, however, was not addressed by the 
Court66 which focussed attention on declarations of independence rather than 
61 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 90.
62 International Court of Justice, Accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration 
of independence in respect of Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion) 22 July 2010 (hereafter ‘Kosovo 
Advisory Opinion’), paras. 79-84. 
63 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra n. 62, para. 83.
64 See Kosovo Advisory Opinion, Written Statement of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, <www.
icj-cij.org/docket/files/141/15652.pdf>, visited 23 July 2013.
65 Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy and Self-Determination: Moral Foundations for Interna-
tional Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2004). 
66 Notably, the ICJ specifically refused to address the issue of remedial secession: Kosovo Advi-
sory Opinion, supra n. 62, para. 83.
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acts of secession themselves, and kept narrowly to the specifics of the Kosovo case 
and its unique international situation. We do, however, find these issues addressed 
by the Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) in the Quebec Secession Reference, where 
some credence seems to be given to the remedial theory as applicable in excep-
tional circumstances. This case emerged from the referendum held in Quebec in 
1995. The Court was asked three questions on the domestic and international 
legality of Quebec Secession. The one I will address here is the second question as 
to whether the Quebec government had the right to effect the secession of Quebec 
from Canada unilaterally.67 
The Court’s opinion, rendered as a collective decision of the whole Court, 
expressed the view, similar to that later voiced by the ICJ, that international law 
neither gives an explicit right of secession nor expressly denies it.68 It did, how-
ever, suggest that what it called ‘unilateral secession’ was not authorised under 
international law, something which could be deduced from the fact that secession 
is only authorised in exceptional circumstances, namely where a community with-
in a state is subject to oppression.69 The Court took the view that, in the absence 
of such oppression, and where unilateral secession is incompatible with the do-
mestic constitution of the state in question, international law would not express-
ly authorise secession.70 The Canadian constitution facilitated a representative 
system of government within which ‘residents of the province freely make politi-
cal choices and pursue economic, social and cultural development.’71 In such a 
situation Quebec did not have a right to secede unilaterally under international 
law,72 leaving international law neutral on the issue, a conclusion which led the 
Court to devote most of the Opinion to a consideration of the domestic consti-
tutional position of Canada in relation to the secession of Quebec. 
One other general point to emerge from the Kosovo Opinion, however, is that 
while international law does not proscribe secession, it does take a view on how 
67 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217 (hereafter ‘Quebec Reference’). Both 
governments sought learned opinions on the international law issues. For a useful collection of 
these, see Anne Bayefsky (ed.) Self-Determination in International Law. Quebec and Lessons: Legal 
Opinions (Springer 2000).
68 Quebec Reference, supra n. 67, para. 112.
69 Quebec Reference, supra n. 67, para. 112.
70 It should be noted however that the Supreme Court of Canada’s excursion into the ‘remedial 
secession’ doctrine seems intended to explore whether secession under some circumstances becomes 
a right. The discussion of the remedial secession doctrine was tangential to the main Opinion and 
the Court remained fairly evasive in the language it used. In any event, even assuming some reme-
dial right does exist under international law, this does not necessarily mean that secession is not 
permissible where ‘remedial circumstances’ are not met; but simply that it is not a right, but nor is 
it prohibited. I am grateful to Jure Vidmar for discussion of this point.
71 Quebec Reference, supra n. 67, para. 136.
72 Quebec Reference, supra n. 67, para. 138.
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an act of secession is effected. If unlawful force (involving an act of aggression by 
a third state73) is used to achieve secession, international law applies the sanction 
of illegality to such an act.74 Even in situations where there is no external act of 
aggression, but the conduct of the secessionist party is in breach of some funda-
mental rule, the Security Council may condemn a declaration of independence; 
but this the Court described as ‘exceptional’ and so ‘no general prohibition against 
unilateral declarations of independence’ can be inferred from cases like Southern 
Rhodesia.75 The Scottish scenario clearly has nothing to do with use of force; nor 
does it involve grave breaches such as have attracted Security Council condemna-
tion in the past. The neutral position therefore applies; international law would 
not prohibit a declaration of Scottish independence, but in a similar way to the 
situation of Quebec, nor would international law expressly authorise Scottish 
secession.
As with Quebec, the constitutional context is therefore crucial. And unlike 
attempts by many other sub-state peoples around the world, since the inauguration 
of the UN Charter, to secure independence by way of secession, a Scottish decla-
ration of independence would, it seems, come with the consent of the United 
Kingdom in light of the Edinburgh Agreement. If there is a negotiated agreement 
between the two governments, or in any event provided the United Kingdom does 
not oppose the independence of Scotland, arguing it to be unlawful under inter-
national law, this should in turn avoid the need for any serious debate about the 
legality of the act of secession under international law.76 
Recognition
One of the first tasks facing an independent Scotland would be to gain the recog-
nition of other states. Recognition is itself a complex and contested area of inter-
national law. There is no institution authorised to determine definitively the 
legitimacy of claims to recognition as a new state. Indeed, the generally held view 
is that recognition is a uniquely political act, operating largely if not entirely at 
73 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra n. 62, para. 80.
74 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra n. 62, para. 81.
75 Kosovo Advisory Opinion, supra n. 62, para. 81. Indeed, the only such resolution adopted 
by the Security Council under Chapter VII was in relation to Southern Rhodesia’s declaration of 
itself as a republic, and this came five years after it initially declared independence. UN Security 
Council Resolution 277, 18 March 1970 (although note also UN Security Council Resolution 
216, 12 Nov. 1965).
76 It is notable that Crawford and Boyle premise their Opinion on ‘the assumption that if Scot-
land becomes independent then it will be with the UK’s agreement rather than by means of a 
unilateral secession.’ Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 14. Instead they characterise the most 
likely scenario as ‘negotiated independence’, paras. 22.2; 90. 
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the discretion of states. Therefore, the recognition of new states emerges from state 
practice on an individual basis, against the backdrop of international diplomacy; 
it is often of the greatest sensitivity and in some cases of the greatest importance 
to a state’s own self-interest. The result is a decentralised practice from which it 
can be difficult for international lawyers to make much sense. 
One starting point, albeit a not entirely helpful one, is the Montevideo Con-
vention which establishes conditions a territory would need to meet to constitute 
a state.77 Article 1 of the Convention does not mention recognition but a prohibi-
tion of premature recognition can arguably be deduced from the failure of a ter-
ritory to satisfy the fundamental requirements of statehood set out in the 
Convention. In particular, the new state must be able to demonstrate that it ex-
ercises governmental control of a clearly defined piece of territory with a clearly 
defined population; and hence that it has the capacity to enter into relations with 
other states.78 These are largely conditions of viability. It seems that Scotland would 
meet all of these criteria quite comfortably. While the Montevideo Convention 
has nothing explicit to say about recognition, some juridical rules have been emerg-
ing over the past two decades which, at least within Europe, go some way in at-
tempting to prescribe when a recognising state should or should not offer 
recognition to a new state.79 These stem largely from attempts in the 1990s to 
introduce some consistency to recognition of successor states in light of the col-
lapse of the USSR and SFRY. To this end the European Communities in 1991 
established Guidelines on the Recognition of New states. These guidelines estab-
lished criteria not contained within the Montevideo Convention, although it 
should also be mentioned that these are non-binding and were not always followed 
in practice. The criteria were stated in fairly general terms but they included re-
quirements that a territory seeking recognition as a new state should have respect 
for the rule of law, democracy and should guarantee minority rights.80 Once again 
it seems clear that an independent Scotland would fully comply with these condi-
tions and, as such, the recognition criteria which emerged in the European Com-
77 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 165 League of Nations 
Treaty Series 19. An important caveat here is that the Convention has a very narrow subscription. 
See: Thomas D. Grant, ‘Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and Its Discontents’, 37 
Colum. J. Transnat’l L. (1999) p. 403.
78 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States of 1933 165 League of Nations 
Treaty Series 19.
79 N. Tsagourias, ‘International Community, Recognition of States, and Political Cloning’, in 
C. Warbrick and S. Tierney (eds.), Towards an ‘International Legal Community’? The Sovereignty 
of States and the Sovereignty of International Law (London, British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law 2006) p. 211-240.
80 Declaration on the ‘Guidelines on the Recognition of New States in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union’, 31 International Legal Materials (1992) p. 1486-1487.
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munities’ Guidelines in the early 1990s would not be any impediment to 
recognition of Scotland as an independent state. 
It is also notable that the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Reference 
referred to another possible condition for recognition which would be relevant to 
the Scottish case. The Court suggested that the decision by third states whether 
or not to recognise Quebec following a unilateral secession could turn on the 
domestic legality of the act.81 As a matter of political practice, therefore, it cer-
tainly seems that other states would be influenced by the attitude of the United 
Kingdom to Scottish independence. The UK’s acceptance of Scotland’s indepen-
dence in the event of a Yes vote and the likelihood of negotiations between the 
two governments to this end would, it seems, greatly assist an independent Scot-
land in the search for early international recognition, and presumably also mem-
bership of international organisations.
Succession
Scotland may well be recognised as an independent state, but how would it take 
its place within the international community? Succession is the situation where 
one state replaces another state in assuming international legal responsibility for 
territory.82 Another important set of issues concerns whether or not, and if so how, 
Scotland would succeed to the rights and responsibilities that currently apply to 
the United Kingdom. 
Unlike the situation with state recognition, state succession has been the subject 
of considerable attention by the International Law Commission of the United 
Nations, resulting in the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of 
State Property, Archives and Debts 1983 (which is not yet in force)83 and the 
Vienna Convention on Succession of States in respect of Treaties 1978 (the 1978 
Convention; in force 1996).84 Despite this work by the ILC the area is nonetheless 
complex and subject to considerable confusion and disagreement.85 It seems 
81 Quebec Reference, supra n. 67, para. 143. Although the Court did recognise (para. 155) that 
‘this does not rule out the possibility of an unconstitutional declaration of secession leading to a 
de facto secession.’ In state practice perhaps a more important issue than domestic legality is ac-
ceptance of the secession (and recognition of the new state) by the state being seceded from. This 
was the turning point in Bangladesh’s emergence as a state. I am grateful to Matthew Happold for 
discussion on this point. 
82 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, 5th edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2003) p. 864.
83 <http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-12&chapter=
3&lang=en>, visited 23 July 2013.
84 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf>, visited 
23 July 2013. The United Kingdom is not a state party to the Convention.
85 Shaw, supra n. 82, p. 863. 
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certain that an independent Scotland would assume responsibility for the in-
ternational relations of the territory of Scotland under international law but 
that does not mean that it will succeed automatically to all of the UK’s rights 
and responsibilities, to treaties, and in particular to membership of international 
organisations. 
There is a tension here. On the one hand, the ‘leading view’ according to Shaw 
is that ‘the newly created state will commence international life free from the 
treaty rights and obligations applicable to the former sovereign.’86 On the other, 
the 1978 Convention provides: ‘any treaty in force at the date of the succession 
of states in respect of the entire territory of the predecessor state continues in force 
in respect of each successor state so formed.’87 By the latter provision Scotland 
would continue to be bound by the rights and responsibilities under treaties in 
force for the UK unless, in the course of negotiations towards independence, 
agreement was reached to the contrary or if it became clear from such negotiations 
that the application of the treaty in respect of Scotland would be incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the treaty or would radically change the conditions 
for its operation.88 However, it should be noted both that the UK is not a party 
to the 1978 Convention and that, as Shaw suggests, it is unclear whether its Ar-
ticle 34 constitutes a rule of customary law. This view is echoed by Aust: ‘The 1978 
Convention is largely an example of the progressive development of international 
law, rather than a codification of customary international law, and is therefore not 
a reliable guide to the customary law rules on treaty succession.’ Aust therefore 
suggests it is better to rely on post-World War II state practice as indicating certain, 
evolving, customary law principles. He does not take a definite position on wheth-
er these principles do or ought to support the provisions of the 1978 Convention.89 
Accordingly, Shaw is clear that: ‘in the vast majority of situations the matter is 
likely to be regulated by specific arrangements.’90 The position therefore remains 
inconclusive but it seems highly likely that Scotland’s succession to the vast major-
ity of treaties would in practice be unproblematic. For the avoidance of doubt it 
would probably make sense for an independent Scotland to accede to major mul-
tilateral treaties in any case. Finally, and assuming the continuation model, the 
UK state would continue to function as before, be recognised as identical to the 
state as it existed prior to the secession, would continue to enjoy the same rights 
86 Shaw, supra n. 82, p. 879.
87 The 1978 Convention, Art. 34. 
88 The 1978 Convention, Art. 34.
89 A. Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, 2nd edn. (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
2007) p. 369. 
See also R. Mullerson, ‘The Continuity and Succession of States by Reference to the Former 
USSR and Yugoslavia’, 42 ICLQ (1993) p. 473, 488.
90 Shaw, supra n. 82, p. 885. 
eclr_9-3.indd   379 10/28/2013   8:39:27 PM
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 24 Feb 2014 IP address: 129.215.19.187
380 Stephen Tierney EuConst 9 (2013)
and owe the same obligations, and retain UK membership of international or-
ganisations.
Membership of international organisations
Scottish succession to membership of international organisations is an intense 
political issue. Regardless of the disagreement surrounding the meaning of Ar-
ticle 34 of the 1978 Convention, we need to treat this as a separate issue. The 
same Convention is clear that succession to constituent instruments of an in-
ternational organization is: ‘without prejudice to the rules concerning acquisi-
tion of membership and without prejudice to any other relevant rules of the 
organization.’91 In other words, international organisations control their own 
membership and any special rules they set for membership supersede principles 
of general international law.
The starting point in considering how Scotland would achieve membership of 
international organizations, therefore, is the constitution of each organization. It 
is beyond the scope of this paper to address each of the organisations of which the 
UK is a member state, but let us look to the United Nations as the most important 
example, before turning to the European Union as another highly significant 
treaty institution. 
The United Nations
It is clearly for the United Nations to define its own membership. It seems highly 
likely that the United Nations will treat the UK as the continuing state and that 
an independent Scotland would, as a new state, be required to apply for member-
ship. In terms of precedents, when India was partitioned upon independence from 
Britain into India and Pakistan, the UN treated India as the continuing state and 
Pakistan had to apply for membership. This has led to a general approach being 
taken by the General Assembly to the effect that 
a State which is a Member of the Organization of the United Nations does not cease 
to be a Member simply because its Constitution or its frontier have been subjected 
to changes, and that the extinction of the State as a legal personality recognized in 
the international order must be shown before its rights and obligations can be con-
sidered thereby to have ceased to exist.92 
91 The 1978 Convention, Art. 4.
92 Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, 1947-1948) UNYB 39-40. Cited by Crawford 
and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 127.
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On the other hand, 
when a new State is created, whatever may be the territory and the populations which 
it comprises and whether or not they formed part of a State Member of the United 
Nations, it cannot under the system of the Charter claim the status of a Member of 
the United Nations unless it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with 
the provisions of the Charter.93 
Subsequent cases support this position, with Singapore applying for new member-
ship and Malaysia retaining its membership status in 1965, Bangladesh applying 
for membership while Pakistan continued within the UN in 1971, Montenegro 
applying for new membership while Serbia continued membership in 2006, and 
South Sudan applying for new membership in 2011 with the remaining Republic 
of Sudan treated as the continuing state for the purposes of membership of the 
UN. Other new States such as the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Eritrea have also 
had to apply for membership as did the former republics of the SRFY, including 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Scotland would, therefore, require to apply for membership under Article 4 of 
the Charter. There do not seem to be any significant obstacles here. The conditions 
for admission are that the candidate territory be a state; be peace-loving; accept 
the obligations of the Charter; be able to carry out its Charter obligations; and be 
willing to do so. Without going into details it seems clear Scotland would satisfy 
each of these criteria. In terms of process, admission depends upon a recommen-
dation by the Security Council and a decision of the General Assembly taken by 
‘a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting.’94 This happened with-
in a few days of application in the cases of Eritrea and South Sudan. Of course, if 
the United Kingdom were to object to Scottish independence, then Scotland could 
find it difficult to obtain the required level of support within the General Assem-
bly for admission, and as a continuing permanent member of the UN Security 
Council the UK could also attempt to use its veto to prevent a recommendation 
that Scotland be admitted. Each of these scenarios seems highly unlikely. Since 
we might reasonably anticipate negotiations between the UK and Scottish Govern-
ments leading to agreed terms for Scottish independence, and since an independent 
Scotland would most probably be considered an important ally by the UK, it is 
realistic to assume UK support for Scotland’s UN membership application. 
93 ‘Succession of States and Governments. The Succession of States in Relation to Membership 
in the United Nations: Memorandum Prepared by the Secretariat’, A/CN.4/149 and Add.l, II 
Yearbook of the International Law Commission (1962), para. 16.
94 Charter of the United Nations, Art. 18(2).
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The European Union
The way in which an independent Scotland would arrive at membership of the 
European Union has been a source of particularly heated debate on account both 
of the centrality of EU membership to the Scottish Government’s plans for inde-
pendence and the indeterminate nature of the question. This debate has also become 
somewhat dislocated by an attempt to arrive at a definitive account of the legal 
position. It would seem that insufficient attention is being paid to the condition-
ing political factors that could well come into play in the event of a majority Yes 
vote in the referendum; factors which could well lead to negotiations to bring 
Scotland into the European Union at the time of its independence from the UK, 
thereby avoiding the lengthy accession process designed for new States joining 
from outside the Union. 
There is no clear precedent here. The cases of Algeria and Greenland are often 
referred to, but both are very different from that of Scotland. The territory of 
Algeria, as part of France, was subject to the Treaty of Rome. When it became 
independent in 1962, however, it ceased to be so while France continued as a 
member state of the EEC. Greenland joined the EEC as part of Denmark’s acces-
sion in 1973. Greenland was later accorded home rule by Denmark and at this 
time (1982) a referendum was held in which the people of Greenland voted to 
leave the Communities. Denmark negotiated Greenland’s withdrawal from the 
EEC, and after lengthy negotiations Greenland left in 1985 while Denmark’s 
membership continued otherwise unchanged.95 However, neither the independence 
of Algeria which was in effect a French colony, nor the withdrawal of Greenland 
which is itself not an independent State, offer a direct analogy to the Scottish 
case.96 The really novel situation should Scottish independence come about is that 
Scotland, unlike Algeria or Greenland, would be seeking not to leave the EU but 
to achieve membership, and the challenge it would pose would be whether it would 
be possible, or indeed desirable, for the European Union and its Member States 
to effect this without any interim period of non-membership.
The EU treaties do not provide for a situation of secession and then purported 
accession to membership by part of a member state. This has led some to argue 
that Scotland would indeed be treated in the same way as any applicant state and 
would require to follow the accession route laid down in Article 49 TEU (here-
after ‘formal accession’). By this provision a new state needs to apply for EU 
membership leading to an accession agreement that would require to be agreed 
unanimously and ratified by all member states. There are a number of criteria 
95 Frederik Harhoff, ‘Greenland’s Withdrawal from the European Communities’, 20 Common 
Market Law Review (1983) p. 13.
96 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 146.
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laid down in Article 49 and if these are met then accession is effected by the 
unanimous decision of the Council, a majority decision of the European Parlia-
ment, and subsequent ratification of the Accession Treaty by the member states 
in accordance with their own respective constitutions. This seems to be the route 
envisaged by the President of the European Commission Jose Manuel Barroso 
who in a letter to the House of Lords Economic Affairs Select Committee on 
10 December 2012 suggested that the Treaties would no longer apply to a ter-
ritory which leaves an existing member state and such a territory would need to 
apply for membership by the ordinary Article 49 route.97 If Scotland requires to 
go through the general accession route it could be a very time-consuming 
process which could possibly fail to attract the unanimous consent of existing 
member states.98
But it seems open to question whether formal accession is the only feasible 
interpretation of the legal path Scotland would be required to follow, or whether 
in fact there are other options available to the EU through which to effect Scottish 
membership more quickly, which would in political terms be preferable since they 
might avoid an interim period of non-membership. In the first place, it can be 
argued that the formal accession approach places excessive weight upon the extent 
to which European Union membership rules are dependent upon principles of 
general public international law. The European Communities/European Union 
have, for over fifty years, been defined by their own judicial organ as sui generis. 
The Union is conceived not as a classical international organisation but rather a 
new legal order, creating rights and obligations not only for its member states, but 
also for its citizens.99 On the one hand, the EU has declared its commitment to 
‘contribute to’ the strict observance and the development of international law,100 
but on the other, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) seems to 
question the supremacy of international law when it comes into possible conflict 
with EU law.101 This could well have implications for EU membership rules. As 
Crawford and Boyle note, while ‘public international law… is the proper law 
for answering questions of state continuity and succession outside the specific 
 97 ‘Economic Implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish Independence’, House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee, Second Report, 19 March 2013, para. 112.
 98 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, seem to envisage the Article 49 route (para. 154). However, 
they do leave open the possibility that through negotiations the ‘accession process could be varied 
in Scotland’s case’ (para. 156). 
 99 See for example, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen [1963] ECR 1 
and Flaminio Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585 (6/64). 
100 Treaty on European Union, Art. 3(5).
101 Joined Cases C‐402/05P and C‐415/05P Kadi & Al Barakaat International Foundation v. 
Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351.
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context of the EU’, there might be ‘a distinction between the position in pub-
lic international law generally and the position in the EU legal order.’102 
This has led a number of commentators to argue that the CJEU would be 
very reluctant to see Scots lose their EU citizenship for any period of time, and 
would adapt its rules to try and avoid such a scenario if possible. Arguments that 
a specific process could, and even should, be tailored to facilitate the membership 
of an independent Scotland rely both upon the flexibility that comes with the EU’s 
sui generis nature, and the importance the Union ascribes to the concept of citizen-
ship, culminating it its entrenchment in the treaties in 1993.103 
One radical argument advanced by Aidan O’Neill is that so important is this 
concept of citizenship in the eyes of the CJEU that the Court might be expected 
to intervene to ensure that Scotland did not in fact leave the EU at all: ‘Scotland 
and [the remaining UK] should each succeed to the UK’s existing membership 
of the EU, but now as two States rather than as one.’104 This citizenship-based 
argument for ‘dual succession’ to membership is, however, simply not plausible. 
First, EU citizenship is contingent on EU membership: an individual requires 
to possess the nationality/citizenship of a member state if he or she is to benefit 
from Union citizenship.105 Also Article 50 permits states to leave the EU. It cannot 
realistically be argued that the nationals of a state leaving the EU would continue 
to be treated by the CJEU as EU citizens.106 One complication here is that the 
United Kingdom would still be a member of the EU and Scots would not lose 
their EU citizenship unless either Scotland or the UK deprived them of UK na-
tionality. There is no requirement in international law that nationals of a new state 
automatically lose the nationality they previously enjoyed. But this is not the point 
O’Neill seeks to make. He seems to suggest that the fact that Scots are currently 
citizens of the EU would lead the CJEU to bring about the succession of Scotland 
102 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 184.
103 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art. 20.
104 Aidan O’Neill, ‘A Quarrel in a Faraway Country?: Scotland, Independence and the EU’, 
Eutopia law blog, 14 November 2011, <http://eutopialaw.com/2011/11/14/685/>, visited 23 July 
2013.
105 ‘Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship’, 
Art. 20(1) TFEU. 
106 The issue is not so much one of the primacy of international law but the fact that state-
hood is as a matter of logic an anterior condition to membership of a particular international 
organization, and by definition, to any rights and obligations which attend such membership. 
Crawford and Boyle acknowledge this: ‘Of course, there might be a distinction between the 
position in public international law generally and the position in the EU legal order. Public 
international law (as already discussed) is the proper law for answering questions of state con-
tinuity and succession outside the specific context of the EU. Even if the ECJ were to take a 
different approach, that would not affect the status of the rUK and Scotland generally. It would 
only affect their position within the EU legal order.’ Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para.184.
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itself to membership. But the dual succession argument does not address the fol-
lowing issues that must be settled for Scotland to accede to membership: on what 
terms would Scotland find itself a member of the EU? Would it be required to 
adopt the euro or not? Would it ‘succeed’ with or without existing UK Treaty 
opt-outs? How many seats in the European parliament would it have, how many 
votes in the Council, etc.? These cannot be matters of succession but inevitably of 
accession, which the EU by the unanimous consent of its members would require 
to agree upon. Thirdly, there are also obvious question marks over the legitimacy 
of the CJEU intervening in this way. To do so would arguably elevate the pre-
rogatives of European citizenship above those of the Union’s own member states. 
It would also ‘effectively usurp the role of the Member States in negotiating 
a political solution.’107 In this light a judicially manufactured route to auto-
matic succession to EU membership seems untenable.
Nonetheless, Crawford and Boyle do still suggest that the CJEU ‘might be 
expected to resist allowing part of a current EU Member State to withdraw auto-
matically from the EU, especially insofar as it would affect the individual rights 
of current EU citizens.’108 This seems to imply that the Court would look to the 
other institutions and Member States to try to resolve the issue through nego-
tiations. As we have observed they also concede the possibility that the EU 
might, in negotiations, be willing to adjust the usual requirements for member-
ship in the circumstances of Scotland’s case.109
David Edward, formerly the UK judge on the Luxembourg court, has also 
entered the debate in the context of negotiations and in doing so offers a more 
nuanced and plausible suggestion for how Scotland’s accession might be man-
aged than the ‘dual succession’ account. In his view Scotland would not auto-
matically accede to membership but a combination of the sui generis nature of the 
Union and the importance of citizenship to the European project should lead to 
a more limited, but for an independent Scotland still potentially significant, out-
come, namely an obligation on the part of the EU institutions and all the member 
states including the UK to negotiate the admission of an independent Scotland 
to the European Union.110 
107 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 183.
108 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 167.
109 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 164. Although it should be repeated that the overall 
sense of the Crawford and Boyle Opinion seems to be the Article 49 route is the more likely road 
to accession for Scotland.
110 David Edward, ‘Scotland and the European Union’, Scottish Constitutional Futures Forum 
blog, 17 Dec. 2012, <www.scottishconstitutionalfutures.org/OpinionandAnalysis/ViewBlogPost/
tabid/1767/articleType/ArticleView/articleId/852/David-Edward-Scotland-and-the-European-
Union.aspx>, visited 23 July 2013. 
eclr_9-3.indd   385 10/28/2013   8:39:27 PM
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 24 Feb 2014 IP address: 129.215.19.187
386 Stephen Tierney EuConst 9 (2013)
Given that the EU is a new legal order, the first port of call in addressing the 
relationship between the United Kingdom, the EU institutions and the other 
member states is, according to Edward, the treaties themselves, and only if they 
do not offer an answer should resort be had to public international law. He then 
turns to Article 50 of the TEU. He observes that, under this provision, the 
withdrawal of a state from the EU requires negotiation of the terms of this act, 
and withdrawal will take effect only on the date agreed or two years after notifica-
tion. This time is needed to unravel ‘a highly complex skein of budgetary, legal, 
political, financial, commercial and personal relationships, liabilities and 
obligations.’111 These obligations are multilateral and often reciprocal. In the case 
of Scottish independence and the potential withdrawal of the territory of Scotland 
from the Union, this would involve not only the rights of Scots but also of nation-
als of other member states, for example foreign students in Scotland and fishermen 
trawling its territorial waters.
So significant are these rights and relationships that Edward believes Article 
50 could plausibly be extended and adapted to the Scottish situation: 
in accordance with their obligations of good faith, sincere cooperation and soli-
darity, the EU institutions and all the Member States (including the UK as exist-
ing), would be obliged to enter into negotiations, before separation took effect, 
to determine the future relationship within the EU of the separate parts of the 
former UK and the other Member States.112 
One objection of course is that Article 50 is only intended to apply to the 
withdrawal of member state s and not of parts of their territory in the form of 
new states. But Edward suggests that it would be illogical to conclude that 
those who drafted the treaty ‘intended that there must be prior negotiation in 
the case of withdrawal but none in the case of separation.’113 It is possibly in 
this context that the CJEU might be asked to intervene, and were it to do so, 
111 Edward, supra n. 110. 
112 Crawford and Boyle take the view that negotiations to ‘adjust the usual requirements for 
membership in the circumstances of Scotland’s case’ would not be required ‘at least on its face, by 
the EU legal order’ (supra n. 56, para. 164). But notably Edward does not seem to be suggesting 
an adjustment to the requirements of membership, but rather an alternative process by which that 
membership could be effected. Another issue is whether the EU and the UK would have an obliga-
tion to negotiate also because the UK, after Scotland’s independence, would be over-represented in 
the EU organs despite becoming a smaller state. This would be unfair to other member states. The 
terms of Scotland’s admission could be bound up also with these negotiations. I am grateful to Jure 
Vidmar for discussion of this point.
113 Edward, supra n. 110. Michael Waibel also argues: ‘Negotiations, with respect to currency 
arrangements and all of the complex legal issues raised by Scottish independence, would offer the 
only sensible way forward’, EJIL: Talk!, 12 Feb. 2013, <www.ejiltalk.org/boyle-and-crawford-on-
scottish-independence/#more-7611>, visited 23 July 2013.
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this would be an opportunity to test Edwards’ argument concerning a duty to 
negotiate.114 
EU citizenship is central to Edward’s argument. The Article 50 duty to 
negotiate can and should be extended to the Scottish case because of a presump-
tion that the Union has a concomitant duty to avoid a situation where, for a 
period of time, Scots would be deprived of their rights as citizens of the EU 
while others in the reciprocal arrangements Edward mentions would see their 
rights adversely affected. To emphasise the plausibility of his argument he ques-
tions the tenability of the alternative scenario, namely that: 
at the moment of separation (or on some other unspecified date), and solely by 
operation of conventional doctrines of public international law without regard to 
the provisions of the EU Treaties – Scotland, its citizens and its land and sea area 
would be cast out into legal limbo vis-à-vis the rest of the EU and its citizens, unless 
and until a new Accession Treaty were negotiated.
Until that moment, Scotland would remain an integral part of the EU; the Scot-
tish people and all EU citizens living in Scotland would enjoy all the rights of 
citizenship and free movement; and the same would apply, correspondingly, to all 
other EU citizens and companies in their relations with Scotland.
Then, at the midnight hour, all these relationships would come abruptly to an end. 
The acquis communautaire would no longer, as such, be part of the law of Scotland. 
Scotland would cease to be constrained in relation to the rates of VAT and corpora-
tion tax. Erasmus students studying in Scotland would become ‘foreign students’ 
liable to pay full third country fees, as would students from England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland. Non-Scottish fishermen would be excluded from Scottish waters. 
And all the waters between Scotland and Norway would cease to be within the ju-
risdiction of the EU – an important security consideration quite apart from fishery 
rights.115
This scenario also presupposes that ‘there would be no legal obligation upon the 
UK, the EU or the other Member States to enter into any negotiations before 
separation with a view to avoiding such a situation coming to pass.’ He considers 
this alternative, carried to this logical conclusion, to be unconvincing. 
But this still stops well short of a dual succession argument. Edward does not 
consider it feasible that there will be ‘a seamless transition from membership as 
part of the UK to membership as an independent State, subject to negotiation of 
114 Another issue is how this question might come before the CJEU. Speculation on this is 
beyond the scope of this article.
115 Edward, supra n. 110. The final point is questionable: the 200 mile exclusive fishing zone un-
der international law has no relevance to security, but the other issues do raise searching questions.
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a few details.’ Instead, and given the unprecedented nature of the situation, with 
‘no express provision in the Treaties to deal with it’, we must look for a third, and 
more plausible, scenario based upon ‘the spirit and general scheme of the Treaties.’ 
And it is in this context that he arrives at a via media by way of the duty to 
negotiate per Article 50. 
In my opinion, the obligations of good faith, sincere cooperation and solidarity, 
which are incumbent on the EU institutions and all the Member States including 
the UK, would require them all, before separation took effect, to enter into negotiations 
to determine the future relationship within the EU of the separate parts of the UK 
and the other Member States. The outcome of such negotiations, unless they failed 
utterly, would be amendment of the existing Treaties, not a new Accession Treaty.116 
The force of the argument comes in part from the fact that the author was himself 
immersed in the highest level decision-making within the EU for so long. Its 
significance hangs on the final sentence of this last quote. The transition to mem-
bership would not be seamless. But it would be categorically different from the 
Article 49 route which has been advanced by others. 
Of course, even if we do take this to be the most plausible scenario by which 
an independent Scotland would move to membership of the EU, this still leaves 
open a number of issues, as Edward himself acknowledges. First, who would 
be involved in such negotiations, how would they take place, would the UK 
negotiate for Scotland since before independence Scotland would not be a state, 
or would the UK allow Scotland to negotiate on its behalf? And what of the in-
terim period? What if negotiations within the EU were still on-going after Scotland 
had achieved independence but before its formal accession to the Union. Here a 
possible answer is provided by Crawford and Boyle. They do not address Edward’s 
Article 50/citizenship argument, but they do suggest that in the interim period 
of negotiations, before an independent Scotland accedes to membership of the 
EU, EU law could continue to have effect in Scotland by virtue of the Euro-
pean Communities Act 1972 s2(4).117
Another issue which flows from the route Scotland would require to take to 
membership is the conditions of that membership. It seems clear that Scotland 
would require to adopt the acquis communautaire, but this is already a facet of 
UK membership and implicitly of the terms of the Scotland Act 1998.118 There 
are also the questions raised above such as the Treaty opt-outs to which the 
United Kingdom is party. Would Scotland be able to maintain these? Would 
it be required to adopt the euro, become part of the Schengen arrangement 
116 Edward, supra n. 110 (emphasis in original).
117 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 165.
118 Scotland Act 1998, ss. 29(2)(d) and 57(2).
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etc.? These issues would be subject to negotiation and the outcome would 
depend in part upon the attitude of other EU member states and institutions. 
In any event a new treaty amendment would be needed to provide, at the very 
least, for distinctive Scottish membership of European institutions, the alloca-
tion of parliamentary seats etc., in the absence of the full Article 49 accession 
process. And such a treaty amendment would still need the ratification of all 
member states.
Finally, we might reasonably assume that the United Kingdom would be treat-
ed as a continuing member of the EU.119 But even here there would seem to be 
a need for treaty amendments, again to accommodate a smaller UK in a pro-
portionate way within European institutions.120 Another complication which 
is beyond the scope of this article is the Conservative Party commitment to 
hold a referendum in the UK on membership of the European Union should 
the Conservative Party be returned to office in the General Election of 2015.121 
This would add another layer of complication if such a referendum were held 
and resulted in a vote to leave the EU before negotiations on transition to 
membership of the EU for an independent Scotland had been concluded. 
Conclusion
The referendum in 2014 will be highly significant. Referendums on sovereignty 
questions are often deeply contested affairs in which the legitimacy of the process 
is widely questioned. The Scottish referendum offers a rare opportunity for a fair, 
lawful process validated by the assent of both governments. In this respect the 
Edinburgh Agreement is a landmark political event, and the Scottish Parliament 
has the opportunity to fashion a referendum process that will be seen by winners 
and losers alike to have been fair and democratic. The two bills going through the 
Scottish Parliament offer detailed regulation of areas such as the franchise, funding 
and spending, and the moratorium period prior to the referendum. There is also 
a significant role for the independent Electoral Commission which has reviewed 
the question and the financial provisions and which will oversee the operation of 
these and other regulatory elements.
The real controversy in the referendum will surround the substantive issues at 
stake. What the Scottish Government means by independence is still to be fully 
elaborated, and whether in the event of a yes vote there would continue to be 
119 Case 148/77, Hansen v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787, which suggests that the 
limits of the territory of a member state is for the state to define. Cited by Crawford and Boyle, 
supra n. 56, para. 159. 
120 Crawford and Boyle, supra n. 56, para. 150.
121 <www.conservatives.com/Policy/Where_we_stand/Europe.aspx>, visited 23 July 2013.
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elements of union between Scotland and the UK, and what form this might take, 
is impossible to predict in the heat of a referendum campaign, particularly one in 
which it is in the best interests of the No campaign to suggest that the transition 
to independence will be complex and challenging. Although the Electoral Com-
mission is correct to recommend that both governments should agree a joint 
position about what would follow the referendum in order to give voters important 
guidance,122 this seems politically unrealistic.
The status of an independent Scotland under international law should not 
present many difficulties. It seems that the UK will be the continuing state and 
an independent Scotland will be seen as a territory aspiring to new statehood. In 
the event that a negotiated move to independence is agreed between Scotland and 
the UK the widespread recognition of Scotland as a state and its succession to 
international obligations should be straightforward. Scotland would, however, 
need to apply for membership of international organisations. The example of the 
United Nations suggests that this too should not be excessively challenging. The 
really indeterminate case is that of the European Union. Different views have been 
voiced in this article. That which seems most consistent with the treaty commit-
ments, most particularly to citizenship, is that, since the EU is at liberty to set its 
own membership rules, a process of negotiations to facilitate Scotland’s member-
ship without a period of exit from the Union would seem to be flow from the 
spirit of Article 50. However, a number of political factors would also come into 
play, not least the attitudes of other member states, including those which would 
not like to encourage sub-sate nationalists within their own states with the idea 
that rapid entry to the EU is a realistic possibility. Much then remains unclear. 
There seems no doubt that an independent Scotland would be a welcome member 
of the EU, but it is impossible at this point to predict definitively how easily or 
on what terms such membership could be effected. 
122 Electoral Commission, ‘Referendum on independence for Scotland’, supra n. 23, para. 5.43.
q
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